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Women at the Bar—A Generation of Change 
November 2, 1978 
Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg† 
Rereading my November 2, 1978 remarks, I am heartened by the 
changes from that day to today.  As Joan C. Williams develops in 
Reshaping the Work-Family Debate, there is a great distance yet to 
travel.  Observing my children’s and grandchildren’s lives, howev-
er, I am hopeful for the future.  And how good it is to have two sis-
ters-in-law with me on the Supreme Court bench.  Visitors can see 
we are here to stay—no longer one-at-a-time curiosities. 
Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
November 1, 2010, Washington, D.C. 
I was a first-year law student in 1956–57, part of an entering class 
that included 9 women among some 500 men. Few of us then had an 
acute sense something was amiss in the resemblance, the sameness our 
classmates displayed. But we did wonder why women’s small numbers 
in law school had not increased—indeed, had gone down since 1950. 
Could it be discrimination, a restrictive quota system? We asked one of 
our best friends on the faculty. Certainly not, he assured us. In selecting 
from the large, gray middle of the application pile, the law school gave 
weight, he said, to anything strange, unusual, singular about an applicant. 
Using that criterion, a bull fiddle player gained a plus, so did a woman. 
Several times in the 70s, I recalled that response—there’s some-
thing strange or singular about women in law. It came to mind in 1971 
when Professor Philip Kurland, an eminent constitutional law scholar, 
wrote in the Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review, question-
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ing the need for the ERA.1 Constitutional amendments may be necessary 
to protect minorities or the unenfranchised, he said. But women are not a 
minority. They have had the vote for more than a half century; they out-
number men in our society. 
The something strange or singular image was in my head again the 
next year, 1972, when former Harvard Law School Dean Griswold, then 
serving with devotion and diligence as the nation’s Solicitor General, 
submitted appellees’ brief in Frontiero v. Richardson,2 one of the major 
1970s sex equality cases. The brief explained to the Supreme Court why 
sex should not rank as a suspect category. That label, and the analysis 
attending it, the Government’s Frontiero brief urged, should be reserved 
for politically powerless, discrete, and insular minorities. Women, of 
course, are a numerical majority in this country, the brief continued, and 
surely are not disabled from exerting their substantial political influence. 
Not to be outdone by a Harvard predecessor, Yale Professor Bork, 
in a swan song as Solicitor General, a brief amicus curiae filed January 
1977 in Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,3 wrote that 
gender-based classification raises a question more “political” than “con-
stitutional” because of “the fact that women are not a political minority.” 
Curious that gentlemen with extraordinary minds, and rare talent 
for making relevant connections, fastened on the census head count, but 
overlooked, or underevaluated, the point beneath our faculty friend’s 
comment in 1956—woman’s virtual absence, her strangeness, singularity 
in arenas where laws and political decisions are made. 
Were women themselves largely to blame? Was it their own lazi-
ness or sense of insufficiency, up to the current decade, that kept them 
outside? When the gates were closed, that was not an available argument. 
Law schools and business schools were way-pavers for their graduates. 
They supplied recruits for posts with power potential in government and 
the economy. Closed gates at these major entry points had a dispropor-
tionately harmful effect. 
Why did it take distinguished lawmen so long to open the gates? 
Tradition was a large factor. For most of our nation’s history, the con-
cepts “woman” and “lawyer” were thought incompatible.4 Until 1920, 
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there was the excuse that citizens who had no vote, no voice in making 
laws, had no business administering, enforcing, or interpreting them. 
But the franchise gained in 1920 had no immediate ripple effect. A 
1922 Barnard College graduate recalled: 
At the time I was ready to enter law school, women were looked 
upon as people who should not be in law schools. I wanted very 
much to go to Columbia, but I couldn’t get in. I went over to see 
Harlan Stone, Dean Stone, who was later Chief Justice of the United 
States, and asked him to open the law school to women. He said no. 
I asked why. He said, we don’t because we don’t, and that was fi-
nal.5 
(Constitutional law students may recall that some fifteen years after this 
episode, a celebrated footnote appeared in Justice Stone’s Carolene 
Products opinion6—a seed note for the suspect classification doctrine 
later developed.) 
Columbia Law School came round on the woman question in 1928, 
late, but over two decades before Harvard Law School opened its gate to 
women. In 1925, the Columbia law faculty reported candidly the reason 
for holding the line—a reason withheld by former Dean Stone. The story, 
as told in a 1925 issue of The Nation: 
The National Woman’s Party wants President Butler to admit wom-
en to the Columbia Law School. Many times in years before the Na-
tional Woman’s Party was born, women tried to get into the Co-
lumbia Law School, and the walls of the masculine sanctuary al-
ways stood firm. President Butler long ago turned decision in the 
matter over to the law school faculty, but a large majority of the 
professors resisted imprecations, pleas, and demands from candi-
dates, organizations, even from benefactors of the school. This de-
fiance of the laws of change and the tendency of the times would be 
magnificent if it were wholly a matter of principle. The faculty, 
however, has never maintained that women could not master legal 
learning or that they should not be made to endure the frank and 
shocking language of the law. No, its argument has been lower and 
more practical. If women were admitted to the Columbia Law 
School, the faculty said, then the choicer, more manly and red-
blooded graduates of our great universities would turn away from 
Columbia and rush off to the Harvard Law School!7 
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The 1925 Nation article concluded with an editorial comment. It sug-
gested that both Harvard and Columbia enter a pact to dilute the red 
blood with a little common sense. 
Enough said of the closed-gate era. Let’s return to the 50s and the 
snail’s pace at which women’s entrance into law school increased up to 
the late 60s. Chilling effect was a concept familiar in constitutional law 
in the 50s and 60s. In the free speech and press context, it was a mainstay 
of the Supreme Court’s 1964 opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan.8 It 
appeared in earlier decisions sensitive to the right of association, NAACP 
v. Alabama9 in 1958, for example. Most recently, the Supreme Court has 
indicated growing awareness that traditional classification by gender, by 
casting the law’s weight against change, serves to chill exploration by 
men and women of their full potential as human beings.10 
Surely there was a chill wind for women in the law schools of the 
1950s, although many of us barely noticed it while we were there. It was 
expected, taken for granted. Our sense of injustice was not aroused until 
years later when younger women, many of them touched deeply by the 
experiences in the 1960s civil rights movement, said the signpost at the 
gate was wrong. It should be changed from “Welcome to the Strange and 
Singular” to “Women are Wanted by the Law Fully as Much as Men 
Are.”11 
To review quickly some of the chilling factors. When women en-
tered law schools in the 1950s, some of our classmates, our teachers, 
even our deans, asked what we were doing in law school occupying a 
seat that could be held by a man. More often than not, I believe, the ques-
tion was not intended to wound or offend. Some thought it a good-
humored ice-breaker. Others were realists. A 1963 survey of placement 
offices at sixty-three law schools tells the story.12 Fifty-seven ranked dis-
crimination against women law students by legal employers as either 
extensive or significant. Although women were long accepted as criminal 
defenders at legal aid, where salaries were low, United States Attorney 
offices would not assign women to the criminal division. Pace-setting 
law firms wanted no women lawyers, prestigious judicial clerkships were 
off-limits to females. With only a handful of exceptions, women did not 
teach in law school. 
                                                        
 8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 9. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 10. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). See 
generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451 (1978). 
 11. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by the Law: Awakening Consciousness in 
the Law Schools, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 480 (1971). 
 12. See James J. White, Women in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (1967). 
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As training for the cold world outside, women were treated to la-
dies’ day in their classes. Textbooks gave such handy advice as “land, 
like woman, was meant to be possessed.”13 Dormitory space was some-
times available for men only. A pervasive attitude was summed up in the 
rumination attributed to Harvard’s then-President Pusey when the Viet-
nam draft call was at its height: we shall be left with the blind, the lame, 
and the women. 
Part of the prediction was accurate. In 1967 women were only 4.5% 
of the nation’s first-year law students, in 1970, they were 8.5%, in 1973, 
nearly 16%. By 1975, 23% of all law students were women. Three 
AALS-approved law schools that year reported women were a majority 
of the entering class, six others reported women exceeded 40% of the 
first-year students, forty-nine others, 30% or more. In the same years, 
women’s entrance into the paid labor force exceeded Bureau of Labor 
Statistics projections for 1990. Law school enrollment of women in 1975 
passed the one-quarter mark, and in 1977, neared 28%.14 Medical schools 
too experienced large increases in women’s enrollment, although in the 
mid-70s, they fell behind the law schools. For the 1976–77 academic 
year, the AMA reported women were 22.4% of the U.S. medical school 
student population.15 
These developments are part of a transition to a new period in the 
history of humankind. An early indicator of it attracted scant attention. In 
the years 1947–61, before the civil rights movement captured headlines, 
before The Feminine Mystique16 was written, there was unprecedented 
growth in employment outside the home of women ages 45–64.17 A steep 
increase for younger women followed later, coinciding with, and shored 
up by, a revived feminist movement—a burgeoning movement caused 
by, and in turn spotlighting, dramatic alterations in women’s lives. 
Among the salient factors, a sharp decline in necessary home-centered 
activity. Few goods consumed at home must be made there nowadays. 
Coupled with that, curtailed population goals and more effective means 
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of controlling reproduction. Added to the picture, vastly extended life 
spans, meaning that for most of our adult years, small children requiring 
close care are not part of the household. The two-earner family has be-
come more common than the family in which a man is sole bread-
winner.18 Within a dozen years, the Bureau of Labor Statistics now 
projects two-thirds of all women age twenty-five to fifty-four will be 
gainfully employed.19 
My Columbia colleague, economist Eli Ginzberg, appraised the 
sum of these changes as the most outstanding phenomenon of the cen-
tury.20 Automobiles, planes, nuclear power plants, all brought about by 
technology, he called infrastructural changes. Important as they are, they 
do not go to the guts of a society, how it works and how it plays, how 
people relate to one another, whether they have children, how they bring 
them up. 
Significant adjustments accompanied women’s law school entrance 
in numbers. Ignoring women, or singling them out for special treatment, 
became inordinately difficult once they appeared all over the seating 
chart. Women’s groups organized in the law schools, vigilant to assist 
teachers, administrators, and peers through the transition to new ways. 
In my day, there was a law wives’ association, but no law women’s 
association. By 1972, most of the accredited law schools listed law 
women’s groups in their catalogs. These associations pressed for more 
vigorous recruitment of women, placement office regulations designed to 
reduce employer discrimination, sex-neutralization of scholarships and 
prizes. Women in association criticized course materials for assuming a 
world in which all actors and doers are men, and elephantine remarks in 
the classroom. Recalcitrants were educated through articles in the law 
school newspapers, public meetings, visits from student delegations. Icy 
irritation, sometimes manifested by hissing and booing, discouraged the 
teacher who incessantly used expressions such as “man and wife,” ad-
dressed the class as “gentlemen,” or filled in a woman’s name in every 
hypothetical involving an incompetent. 
An example of the enlightenment, told by a dear colleague at Rutg-
ers Law School who was preparing a casebook on land transfer and 
finance in 1970. One of the topics was real estate brokerage; one of the 
questions, what explains the high incidence of litigation involving bro-
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 19. See Howard N. Fullerton, Jr. & Paul O. Flaim, New Labor Force Projections to 1990, in 
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP’T OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 3, 5 (Dec. 1976). 
 20. FORBES, Nov. 15, 1977, at 177–78. 
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kers. In a draft tried out in a seminar, this comment appeared: “In form-
ing your own theory as to why there is so much litigation, it may be use-
ful to note that 40% of all real estate brokers are women.” When the ma-
terial was distributed, the women students who used it suggested that the 
conjecture betrayed a certain bias or insensitivity. The professor con-
ceded he had not checked for correlations with religious affiliation, na-
tional origin, race, height, or hair color. He deleted the remark. It was a 
poor attempt at humor, he said, a distraction that did not help, but only 
impeded study of the topic. 
Of course, there remains some longing for the good old days. A Co-
lumbia colleague reports that before the 70s, when the class was moving 
slowly, and his queries were greeted with a series of “unprepareds,” the 
solution was ever at hand. Call on the woman. She was always prepared. 
She could be relied on for a crisp right answer nine times out of ten. No-
wadays, he laments, there’s no difference. The women are as unprepared 
as the men. 
Judicial notice of the changing complexion of the legal profession 
evolved during the same period. Judges participating in law school activ-
ities, such as moot court, noticed the difference, and in their own baili-
wick, they found women in positions once reserved to men. Examples 
from the top. Up to 1971, only three women in the Supreme Court’s his-
tory had ever served as a Justice’s law clerk. During the years 1971 to 
1976, a total of fourteen women had attained these coveted posts. Girls 
as well as boys now serve the Court as pages. Women and men hold jobs 
as High Court security officers. 
As of July 1972, there had never been a woman member of the 
prestigious legal staff at the Solicitor General’s Office. By 1976, three 
women served in that small-sized but very important office. Women 
lawyers pleading before the Supreme Court, once a curiosity, now appear 
with increasing frequency. It is not even a remarkable event these days 
when women lawyers represent both sides in a Supreme Court argument. 
On November 1, 1978, for example, the High Court heard argument in 
three cases. In two out of the three,21 women lawyers appeared on both 
sides. They represented, respectively, the United States, the National Or-
ganization for Women, a criminal defendant, and the State of Missouri. 
Modifications in the behavior from the bench as well as doctrinal 
development attended women’s appearance in numbers at the bar. At the 
decade’s start, a raised consciousness surely had not swept the judiciary. 
A sample from a New York trial court, a 1970 published opinion reject-
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ing a woman civil litigant’s challenge to the state’s automatic exemption 
of women from jury service.22 The plaintiff had come to the “wrong fo-
rum,” the judge explained. Her lament should be addressed to her sisters 
who prefer “cleaning and cooking, rearing of children and television 
soap operas, bridge and canasta, the beauty parlor and shopping,”23 to 
participation in the administration of justice. 
That same year, during Supreme Court argument in Phillips v. Mar-
tin Marietta Corp.,24 the first Title VII25 gender-discrimination case to 
reach the High Court, the Chief Justice said, benignly, he “would take 
judicial notice, from many years of contact with industry, that women are 
manually much more adept than men.” They make the best secretaries, 
he added. Looking to Government counsel for confirmation, the Chief 
Justice continued, “The Department of Justice, I am sure, doesn’t have 
any male secretaries.” (I have a male secretary this year. He hails from 
the State of Washington, and he is super!) 
By 1973, a new awareness was dawning, but traditional habits of 
thought die hard. An illustration from a three-judge federal district court 
argument that year in a constitutional gender discrimination case.26 The 
court had raised a question about a recent Supreme Court decision, Fron-
tiero v. Richardson,27 a decision directing the military to accord married 
servicewomen the same fringe benefits married servicemen receive. 
Judge One asked: Isn’t it the rule now that all Army officers are 
treated equally? 
Counsel responded: Not yet. Distinct differences in opportunities 
for men and women in the military remain.  
Judge Two was dubious: I don’t know, he said, they keep putting 
women on battleships and planes. [That observation, by the way, 
was less than wholly accurate.] 
Counsel again: They are not on ships, Congress has prohibited 
that,28 and flight training for women is just beginning. 
Judge Three, unable to hold back: You’re wrong about that. Oh so 
wrong. Women have been in the Air Force for years. Believe me, I 
know based on personal experience. 
                                                        
 22. De Kosenko v. Brandt, 313 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1970). 
 23. Id. at 830. 
 24. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). 
 26. Wiesenfeld v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D. N.J. 1973), aff’d 
sub nom. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 27. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 28. The prohibition was held unconstitutional in Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 
1978). 
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The courtroom was silent for a moment, no one laughed, then coun-
sel returned to the main line of her argument. She wanted to point out 
some men she knew didn’t have their feet firmly planted on the ground. 
Would that have been wise? Her primary interest was to win the case, 
preferably with a unanimous bench. 
Another set of illustrations, these from two cases argued in the Su-
preme Court in tandem in October 1974, both challenging Louisiana’s 
then-volunteers-only system for women’s jury service.29 In one, court-
assigned counsel argued that his client, a man, had been denied his Sixth 
Amendment right by the state’s scheme, an arrangement which meant, in 
practice, no women on juries.30 
Mid-way into appellant’s argument Justice Rehnquist volunteered: 
“Mr. King, when we used to try cases where I practiced [in Arizona], we 
used to follow a maxim, which is perhaps an old wives’ tale, that ‘wom-
an is man’s best friend but her own worst enemy,’ and the idea was, if 
you had a male client you wanted a bunch of women on the jury, and if 
you had a woman client, you wanted a bunch of men on the jury. I take 
it, in your area, Mr. King, they don’t follow any such handy maxim.” 
Mr. King was perplexed. His was a male client, but the jury selec-
tion system he assailed offered no opportunity to follow the handy max-
im. In Louisiana, at that time, it was a bunch of men or no jury. On this 
occasion, the reaction of the courtroom observers was unmistakable. 
Women from several law schools attended the argument. Their groan 
was audible throughout the chamber. 
In the paired case,31 women personal injury litigants were the chal-
lengers. The same Justice interjected: “I thought the new theory was 
there’s very little difference between men and women, so wouldn’t the 
male jurors be women’s peers?” The very same question was asked in 
the High Court November 1, 1978, when the Justices were asked to dec-
lare unconstitutional Missouri’s law exempting “any woman” from jury 
service.32 Understanding of the point was indicated by some on the 
bench. Yes, women and men are individuals of equal dignity, they should 
be counted equally by their Government and before the law. But they are 
not the same, they have distinctive qualities most of us value highly. Few 
would disagree with the French in applauding the difference. Still, peti-
tioner’s attorney did not relish the no doubt well-meant humor in the 
concluding comment Justice Rehnquist made when the attorney finished 
                                                        
 29. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) and Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975) 
(remanding for consideration of mootness). 
 30. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
 31. Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975). 
 32. Duren v. Missouri, 556 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). 
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her argument and was about to sit down: “You won’t settle for putting 
Susan B. Anthony on the new dollar then?” The attorney held her tongue, 
although she was sorely tempted to say, “No, your Honor, tokens will not 
do.” 
Many jurists, I think, have genuinely changed their perspective, 
others may hold their comments till women are out of sight. But all-male 
retreats are on the wane. I expect, before very long, the old boys will find 
no escape even at judges’ conference tables. Doctrinal change in the 70s 
could not be characterized as altogether even and tidy. Still, it seems to 
me remarkable given the starting point. Justice Jackson put it this way in 
a 1947 opinion: 
The contention that women should serve on juries is not based on 
the Constitution, but on a changing view of women’s place in public 
life, which has progressed in all phases, but has achieved constitu-
tional compulsion in only one particular—the grant of the fran-
chise.33 
In other words, the Nineteenth (woman’s suffrage) Amendment 
apart, the Constitution was thought an empty cupboard for sex equality 
claims. The Warren Court of the 50s and 60s, although it uncabined 
equal protection in other settings, had not moved at all in this area. 
Not till 1971, in the unanimous Reed v. Reed34 decision, did the Su-
preme Court respond affirmatively to a woman’s complaint of unconsti-
tutional gender-based discrimination. By 1975, in place of judicial notice 
of the proposition that women make the best secretaries, the Court, in 
Stanton v. Stanton,35 judicially noticed “women’s presence in business, 
the professions, in government, indeed in all walks of life.” In 1977, the 
Court’s newest member, Justice Stevens, wrote that habit rather than 
analysis or actual reflection made it seem acceptable for the legislator to 
pigeonhole people by sex.36 For too much of our history, he said, there 
was the same inertia in distinguishing between black and white. And a 
majority of the Court, in 1976 and 1977, openly acknowledged that a 
dynamic equal protection principle mandates an elevated level of review 
for explicitly gender-based classification.37 
The development remains uneven and unfinished, impeded by the 
unsettled fate of the federal ERA. But it has reached at least a mid-
passage state, it has progressed beyond the point of return to old ways. 
Eventually, the Court may take abortion, pregnancy, out-of-wedlock 
                                                        
 33. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 290 (1947). 
 34. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 35. 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
 36. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222 (1977) (concurring opinion). 
 37. Id.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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birth, and explicitly gender-based differentials out of the separate cubby-
holes now assigned to them, acknowledge the practical interrelationships, 
and treat these matters as part and parcel of a single, large sex equality 
issue.38 That synthesis perhaps depends on clearer directions from the 
political arena, but it seems a likely candidate for 1980s attention. 
In the past few years, I have participated in, and read about, panel 
discussions addressing the question: Is women’s participation in the legal 
profession in numbers affecting the way law business is conducted, or 
the shape and direction of legal development? Similar questions were 
broached in informal discussion at the AALS Annual Meeting in 1971. 
Conversation was stimulated by the prediction that a law school popula-
tion including as many women as men was not very far down the road. 
One of the participants in the discussion, after a moment of insecurity, 
smiled, confident again, and said, nothing very much would change. 
What were women lawyers after all? Simply soft men. 
Another elaborated: Women lawyers come in two varieties. The 
first would not figure at all in the real world of legal business. They were 
the social workers who would devote themselves to the poor and the op-
pressed. The second were the backstagers, who would find congenial 
work in drafting wills and contracts, research and brief writing. The 
rough and tumble, knock down, drag out adversary confrontations would 
continue, as always, with hard men center stage. 
Four years earlier, in 1969, a Michigan Law School professor, 
James White, had published the results of his survey of law school gra-
duates in the decade 1955–65.39 As to the social worker characterization, 
he reported no statistically significant difference between women and 
men who said a desire to help society was important in their choice of a 
legal career. On the other hand, the number of women who marked good 
remuneration as important exceeded the men by a statistically significant 
margin. But the social worker stereotype does hold up; at least to this 
extent: women lawyers generally are sympathetic to humanitarian caus-
es. So are many men who have experienced discrimination or subordi-
nate, underdog status. 
On the rough and tumble, in The Psychology of Sex Differences,40 
Stanford Professors Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin confirm a link 
between aggression and dominance in little boys, and in apes. But, Mac-
coby points out, human boys grow up. The leadership style effective to-
                                                        
 38. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 57–58 & n.320 (1977); Kenneth L. Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1036 
(1976). 
 39. White, supra note 12. 
 40. ELEANOR MACCOBY & CAROL JACKLIN, PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES (1974). 
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day normally is not the ruthless tough guy who forcibly imposes his will 
on others. Rather, the qualities that count are the ability to conciliate 
among opposing factions, and to foster development of younger, less 
experienced people in return for their loyalties. 
The questionnaires for Professor White’s survey were accompanied 
by a cover letter designed to encourage responses. It said, “Only through 
a uniform response will we be able to gather statistics which may form a 
basis for assault upon the citadel of discrimination against women law-
yers.”41 Professor White reported that some women lawyers denied the 
existence of discrimination. A sample from that group: 
The only citadel of discrimination against women lawyers is the one 
they have created themselves. . . . The more . . . men are harassed 
by the fight for women’s rights, the more they are going to be 
against them.42 
I suspect that a survey taken today would turn up fewer responses 
of that kind. 
Contrast with the unsisterly or Aunt Polly type, a more recent play-
er who would constrain the woman lawyer. She may be a radical femin-
ist, an idealogue who inveighs against women assuming “male values.” 
Earlier—for some women, even today—fear checked (or checks) im-
modest aspiration—fear of the consequences at home of too much suc-
cess on the job. The message: hold back, don’t work too hard, be sure 
dinner is on the table at 7:00. De-escalate is also the message of those 
who believe that the traditional impediments to a woman’s achieving 
high status, or large monetary reward, had one beneficial effect: they re-
moved women from the corruption of the “rat race.” To stay uncor-
rupted, the argument goes, women must avoid internalizing “establish-
ment” values, they must not capitalize on opportunity presented by an 
illegitimate opportunity structure. 
A different perspective was offered by a woman in a public interest 
firm operated by four women and one man. She said she would like a 
better sex balance, but would not be happy if men became a majority. 
Not because women are one great sisterhood: each one of us is aggres-
sive, competitive, “a lawyer,” she said. But we work together far more 
than men do. And we do not have to put up with nonsense—the sexist 
comments, the putdowns. Who needs it? 
Men do, my colleague sociologist Cynthia Epstein (source of sever-
al points and illustrations in this talk) stresses. Men need to learn, and 
they do when women show up in their midst in numbers, not as one at a 
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time curiosities. Men need the experience of working with women who 
demonstrate a wide range of personality characteristics, they need to be-
come working friends with women. 
The 1967 Michigan Law Review article in which Professor White 
sets out data from his survey concludes with a discussion of the utility of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,43 then very new legislation. 
(Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, na-
tional origin, religion, or sex.) Professor White posed several questions.44 
Would it violate Title VII to refuse to hire women lawyers? Clearly yes, 
he said. Could a legal employer maintain special jobs for women only—
jobs with less responsibility and pay than men’s jobs? Definitely no, was 
his answer. 
Could a firm require higher qualifications for women? There, in 
those early days, he hesitated. Probably yes, he ventured, if the employer 
could prove women were more likely to leave than men. Finally, must 
firms treat females equally, even to the extent of allowing them to com-
pete for places in the partnership? That was the toughest of all. Professor 
White resolved it in a way familiar to lawyers when values conflict. He 
balanced—on one side, the virtue of letting lawyers freely choose their 
own partners, on the other, the discrimination women suffered. The solu-
tion, a compromise: advance the woman in work assignments, and if she 
is of sufficient quality, pay her as you would a partner, but keep her title, 
associate. The loss to her, he supposed, would be minimal—only status 
and a voice in decisions members of the partnership make. As a 
postscript, Professor White noted Title VII could not be expected to in-
spire real fear in the male bastions. Discrimination would be hard to 
prove, and what woman would risk the notoriety, the stigmatization of 
putting her name on the line as complainant. 
Within a half dozen years after Professor White’s article appeared, 
discrimination charges filed against several of New York’s best-known 
law firms began settling out. Names on the line were law women from 
NYU and Columbia; these second- and third-year law students, and re-
cent graduates, complained on behalf of a class estimated at 500. My 
Columbia colleague, Harriet Rabb, was the lawyer in charge. Much pub-
licity attended the agreements of settlement with Rogers & Wells early in 
1976, and the next year, with Sullivan & Cromwell. There was no doubt 
by then that all of Professor White’s questions were easy. The legal re-
quirements are nondiscrimination and equal opportunity. Women be-
longed everywhere in the practice, the agreements confirmed, they had to 
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be accepted as full members of the club. To make that specific, the Rog-
ers & Wells settlement, for example, provides: the firm will not organize 
or sponsor events in clubs where women are excluded from membership; 
it shall invite and encourage female attorneys to participate in firm 
events and in meetings with clients on the same basis as male attorneys; 
it will request in writing any clubs, the membership dues of which are 
paid for partners by the firm, which do not admit women, to reverse such 
policy. (I am told that shortly after the agreement, the club that was Sec-
retary Rogers’s favorite for lunch, opened membership to women.) 
In 1900, my home state, New York, had forty women lawyers, Illi-
nois, with eighty-seven, easily led the country. Women’s admission to 
the bar was prohibited in Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, South 
Carolina, and Vermont. Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, and Rhode 
Island reported no law barring women, but no women applicants. Geor-
gia’s official position: no women want to study law. The change is exhi-
larating. 
The turn-of-the-century women-at-the-bar survey was undertaken 
by Isabella Mary Pettus,45 one of the rare women in the law those days. I 
would like to close these remarks with comments she made in presenting 
the survey results. She thought women at the bar in numbers was bound 
to improve the profession and the law. But she did not think of sisters-in-
law as entirely unselfish improvers of humankind. Rather, she spoke of 
the large personal gain—autonomy, responsibility for planning one’s 
own life, that sweet sense of independence, which, once known, is not 
easily relinquished. 
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